This paper presents an estimation of the impacts of microcredit on labor and human capital following a quasi-experiment specifically designed to control for endogeneity and selection bias in the context of urban Mexico. We find important indirect trickle-down effects of credit through labor expenditure that benefit poor laborers; however, these effects were only observed when loan-supported enterprising households reached a level of income well above the poverty line. We also find significant, although small impacts of credit on children´s schooling that could be potentially reinforced by improvements in lending technology, school grants and additional ex-ante preventive and ex-post protective riskcoping products.
Introduction
The relationship between credit and labor is particularly important in the context of urban poverty. For the moderately poor and non-poor, income-generating activities are often important sources of income, whereas for the extreme poor, labor is, in many cases, the only source of livelihoods. Thus, by improving access to credit, a direct impact on labor intensity could be observed even beyond the household, with indirect impacts on poor laborers that are hired by loan-supported enterprising households. This can be crucial for the extreme poor, since in the urban context farming activities are rarely existent. Higher levels of labor intensity could, however, increase the propensity of child labor from young family members, and thus compromise wider impacts on human capital and long-run patterns of development. We explore all these wider impacts using data collected from households participating in three microcredit programs operating in Mexico. The paper is organized as follows: Section 1 presents the analytical framework where the relationship between credit and efficiency labor is analyzed. Section 2 describes the quasi-experimental research designed followed to control for endogeneity and selection bias, while in section 3 we discuss the econometric procedure to test for the underlying assumptions of no endogeneity and selection problems. Sections 4 and 5 examine the impact of microcredit on labor intensity, and labor hiring, respectively, whereas section 6 analyzes the impacts on children´s schooling. Section 7 concludes with some policy recommendations.
Credit and efficiency labor
We begin the discussion by considering the case of an enterprising household engaged in an income generating activity that produces a market good y, based on a Cobb-Douglas-
, where L and K are the quantity of labor and capital, respectively, and α is a parameter of technology in the production of y. As pointed out by Pitt and Khandker (1998) , it is very unlikely that at the bottom end of the income distribution α changes, at least in the short-term. For that reason, we assume that technology remains constant, i.e. 1 α = .
In the production of y, the enterprising household will supply the amount of labor Since we assume that α remains constant, then an increase in the level of output, coming from a capital injection of a microcredit, will lead to an increase in labor intensity, which once reaching the maximum of H L , may lead to labor hiring.
Note, however, that the demand for labor is not only a function of household income but also of the cost of labor. As pointed out by Leibenstein (1957) ; Mazumdar (1959) and Dasgupta (1993) , labor efficiency is conditional upon factors such nutrition, abilities and efforts that determine labor productivity. Informational asymmetries may also play an important role in that process (see e.g. Foster and Rosenzweig 1996, and Bardhan and Rudra 1986 ). Dasgupta and Ray (1986) have actually pointed out that at low levels of household income, even if an enterprising household wants to hire laborers, they soon realize that they can only afford to hire unskilled and malnourished laborers with very low productivity.
They may also perceive it to be very risky to employ workers for not having enough information about their skills, behavior or moral integrity. In the end, the enterprising household may simply decide to self-employ, leading to an increasing propensity of child labor from young family members, with negative impacts human capital and on long-run patterns of development.
Thus, the cost of buying an efficiency unit of labor is given by the higher the household income, the lower the cost of buying additional efficiency units of labor µ , and thus, the higher the probability of reporting labor expenditure,
If by borrowing from a microcredit program, an enterprising household increases the probability of an income rise, then we may observe an indirect impact of credit on poor laborers whose skills and nutrition levels are improved by the fact of being employed by an enterprising household. This could potentially lead to improvements in labor efficiency.
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Research design
In order to investigate the relationship between credit and labor, we designed a type of quasi-experiment that is often referred to as a non-equivalent, post test-only quasi-experiment (Campbell and Stanley 1966) , in which two groups of households are sampled: treatment and control. A major problem that emerges with the non-equivalent, post test only quasiexperiment, referred hereafter as quasi-experiment, is that these two groups may differ in important ways that influence the decision of borrowing and thus, the outcome of interest.
In other words, there might be unobservable factors related to e.g. individual efforts, abilities, preferences and attitudes towards risk that cause a demand-related bias. A fundamental assumption here is that participation in a microcredit program is always voluntary. But even if we had a control group willing to take risks and borrow from a microcredit organization, we may still face selectivity discrimination made by the lender or group members that screen out applicants for e.g. living faraway from the place where the microcredit program operates, a supply-related bias.
Although we did not observe households that chose either to participate or not, and households that were either accepted or rejected by the lender, we were able to specify the distribution of households that self-selected to participate in a microcredit program, and were accepted by the lender with a time-variance difference that accounts for the length of membership. Consequently, households who had self-selected to participate in a credit program and had been accepted by the lender, and therefore were actively borrowing from a microcredit program were eligible to be sampled as members of the treatment group.
Similarly, households who had self-selected to participate in a credit program and had been accepted by the lender, but had not received a loan by the time the quasi-experiment was conducted, were eligible to be sampled as members of the control group.
We also followed a geographical criterion, i.e. we operationalised the quasi-experiment among households living in the same neighborhood, in areas with a minimum level of socioeconomic homogeneity, where the comparison between treatment and control groups was reasonable. By following this sampling strategy, it was possible to hold constant factors such as infrastructure, costs of inputs, and local prices that could cause, otherwise, an endogeneity problem. A high population density in poor urban areas made possible to follow this approach. As a result, we assume that the selection and endogeneity problems are controlled through the process of data collection itself. In section 3 we follow a specific econometric estimation procedure to test for such assumptions.
Given the homogeneity of household characteristics, a sample survey was the preferred type of data collection (Babbie 1990 ). The sampling strategy was implemented using a multistage procedure in the form of clusters (Fink and Kosecoff 1985) : first, we had access to a list of program participants (both treatment and control) from three case-study organizations (the clusters), and who lived in the selected areas. Participants with loan in arrears were included in the list. In the second stage, both treatment and control groups were selected at random. The survey was administrated face-to-face employing, as instrument of data collection, a semi-structured-interview format iii .
In the end, we surveyed 148 households: 55 participating at Community Financial Services (Fincomun) and living in San Miguel Teotongo, a neighborhood located to the eastern periphery of Mexico City; 46 participating at Centre for the Assistance of the Microentrepreneur (CAME) and living in the Chalco Valley, one of the most densely populated municipalities in the country located to the eastern periphery of the Metropolitan area of Mexico City; and 47 participating at Programs for Women (Promujer) and living in Tula City and the surrounding areas, a locality about two hours from Mexico City. Thus, we have three locations, one for each organization (see table 1 for more details).
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Testing for selection bias and endogeneity
Before analyzing the impact of microcredit on labor, we proceed to test for the underlying assumption of no selection bias. In order to do so, we initially considered a Heckman estimation procedure (Heckman 1979) with an identifying instrumental variable (IV) iv . This Maximum Likelihood method follows the model:
where i I is a dichotomous variable with value = 1 I for treatment households and = 0 I for the corresponding control group. Since both treatment and control groups are program participants with a time-variance difference that accounts for the length of membership,
where ( ) φ ⋅ and ( ) Φ ⋅ are the density of the distribution function and the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal, respectively, and
results from the covariance matrix derived in Maddala (1977) as follows:
Cov (u ,u ,ε ) 
The two-stage Least Square (2SLS) procedure yields consistent estimates in the parameter of interest δ (Wooldridge 2002) 
where
* * if 0 
which generates the conditional mean function of the observed dependent variable i C that is censored at zero for control groups and have disturbances normally distributed, which can be used to estimate the determinants of the level of borrowing by treatment and control groups alike vi through the marginal effects of i X on i C as follows vii :
This is actually the reason of using a Tobit specification equation. If no censoring had occurred, the Tobit model would be inappropriate (Maddala 1999) . Thus, the borrowing function, on the one hand, takes the form: 
where L α is the intercept and L β , L θ and δ are the unknown parameters, and
u , the error term that reflects unmeasured determinants of i L that vary from household to household.
We have included in (12) and (13) Since i C is included as the impact variable in (13), we need to identify an instrumental variable to control for policy-specifics that affect the credit equation but not the outcome of interest. This instrument must satisfy the same conditions as in the Heckit in order to estimate the 2SLS Tobit procedure, the type of method that Amemiya (1984) refers to as Type III Tobit model. We derive that estimation equation as follows:
where i R and υ are the predicted Tobit residuals and its parameter estimate, respectively, and ( ) (14) to yield consistent and efficient estimators (Wooldridge 2002) . The null of no selection bias is tested in similar fashion as in the Heckit; however, now we use the 2SLS heteroskedasticity-robust t statistic on the predicted residuals: when 0 υ ≠ , a selection problem is encountered.
Selecting the instrumental variable
We have identified as the instrument a continuous variable (coded as DISTANCE) that captures the time participants spent since they left home (or business) until they arrived to the branch, and which is used as a proxy of accessibility to credit. Our argument relies on the idea that the correlation between program participation and accessibility emerges from two sources: 1) A process involving choice, where households reporting high transaction and opportunity costs of participation would either have high incentives to borrow the largest amount of credit, in order to compensate these costs, or simply drop out or not to participate in the first place. 2) Microcredit programs impose due to transaction costs implicitly related to monitoring and enforcement activities, lending restrictions to households living outside the branch's operational radius viii .
When equation (12) (coded as MILLS), the assumption of no self-selectivity. In this sense, the evidence suggests that increasing levels of borrowing are a function of policy-specifics that are exogenously determined by the lender. We found no evidence to imply that it is due to unobservable factors that are related to individual choice or preferences.
In order to confirm the assumption of exogeneity, we exploit the qualities of the we compute the Hausman statistic in STATA as follows:
The computed Hausman statistic reports a very small value, In this sense, by following a geographical criterion during the process of data collection, we were able to control for local factors that could potential cause an endogeneity problem, allowing us to concentrate on the OLS results discussed below.
The impact of microcredit on labor intensity
As both the units of labor, i L , and the maximum amount of credit, i C , are in logarithmic form, the parameter estimate δ measures the elasticities of (latent) units of labor in hours invested with respect to credit. The slope coefficient reports a positive sign and statistical significance at the 5%, although the magnitude of the impact appears to be small. More precisely, the econometric results suggest that if the maximum amount of credit had gone up by one percent, the units of labor invested is predicted to increase in the order of 0.029%, ceteris paribus.
For comparative purposes, we have estimated equation (13) We are also interested in examining the impacts of credit over time. This is particularly important due to the fact that microcredit programs extensively use progressive lending as an incentive device to mitigate moral hazard and reduce operational costs in the long run. at the mean, the number of units of labor invested is predicted to increase at the annual rate of 9.2% after joining the microcredit program. In order to estimate the rate of growth over the period of time that treatment households had participated in the credit program, we compute the compound rate of growth using the antilog of δ as follows:
Our results predict a compound rate of annual growth in units of labor invested in the order of 9,6%, which is slightly higher than that of 9.2% obtained from the instantaneous estimation. Note that the value reported from the constant is equal to 6.2. Since the constant reflects the log of units of labor invested at the beginning of program participation, then by taking the antilog of 6.2, we can estimate the average number of hours invested by control households. We predicted this value at approximately 499 hours per month. In this sense, after one year of program participation, an average household would be able to increase the number of units of labor invested in income-generating activities from 499 to 547 hours per month. Our results clearly reflect the involvement of more than one household member in income-generating activities, which as discussed in section 1, could potentially have negative impacts on children´s schooling, or after reaching certain income levels, go beyond the boundaries of the household, and indirectly benefit poor laborers. We examine in section 5 the indirect impacts on labor hiring before analyzing the impact on children's schooling in section 6. decided to follow a Tobit specification equation (Tobin 1958) in the form: As both labor expenditure and household income are in logarithmic form, the parameter estimate β in equation (15) measures the elasticity of latent expenditure on efficiency labor with respect to household income. In an attempt to capture any direct relationship between labor hiring and credit, equation (15) Note that the estimated income of the employing household is well above the capability-based poverty line derived by Sedesol (2002) for urban poverty in Mexico xi . It seems that at low levels of income, the cost of hiring units of efficiency labor is too high, either due to low levels of productivity or informational asymmetries. Mosley and Rock (2004:477) Although we find no evidence of labor hiring below the capability-based poverty line, we did find that 27% of the hired laborers were below a food-based poverty line derived by Sedesol (2002) , which identifies extreme deprivation in urban areas, and almost 60% were below an asset-based poverty line, which has been derived to measure moderate poverty.
Indirect impacts on labor hiring
The empirical evidence also reports important differences between treatment and control households in relation to the wage paid to laborers relative to the poverty lines. For analytical purposes, we focus on the capability-based poverty line. While laborers hired by treatment households received a wage 25% above the poverty line, the corresponding control groups paid a wage far below that threshold of deprivation (about 64.4%). It would seem that there is a positive impact of program participation on laborers' welfare. Evidence from a cross-tabulation show a statistical significant association at the 0.05 level between treatment and control groups in relation to the units of labor hired, measured in hours per week. Workers employed by treatment households worked on the average 34 hours per week vis-à-vis 19.7 hours reported by workers employed by control households (see table 5 ).
This could ultimately benefited poor laborers.
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Labor intensity vs. labor efficiency
The difference in the wage rate reported in The results from the regression equation report an elasticity in the order of 1.19 and statistically significant at 1% level (t-statistic= 5.73, p= 0.00) xii . Our findings suggest that enterprising households not only increase labor expenditure as a consequence of higher levels of labor intensity, but also due to efficiency factors. Unfortunately, given data restrictions, we were unable to determine whether wage differences emerged as an indirect effect of program participation or simply because better off households were able to hire relatively more skilled workers. We speculate the former given the proximity of the predicted elasticity to the unity, although more research will be needed to confirm such supposition. In the following section, we examine the impact of microcredit on children schooling.
The impact of microcredit on children´s schooling
The examination of the impact of credit on children schooling is particularly relevant in the context of the income-human capital relationship that affects children´s future earnings. Our argument relies on the strong and positive association between children's schooling and future levels of labor productivity (see e.g. Spence 1973 and Schultz 1988) . On the one hand, if rising levels of labor intensity, as a result of participating in a microcredit program, increase the propensity of child labor from young family members, then long-run patterns of development could be seriously compromised. On the other hand, if access to credit plays the role of an ex-post risk-coping mechanism against idiosyncratic income variability and transitory external shocks, then an indirect impact on children's schooling could be observed, with long-run effects on labor productivity, and the poverty trap xiii .
The particular characteristics of the education system in Mexico, where primary and secondary instruction are free of tuition fees, complicated the use of household expenditure on formal education as a variable to fully capture the level of households´ investment in human capital. In fact, the use of such a variable would have only accounted for seasonal expenditure on uniforms, shoes or stationery. For that reason, we decided to concentrate on a qualitative response variable (coded as SCHOOLING) that captures household decisions of whether or not stop sending their children to school. We considered children aged 5 to 17 from the sampled households at the time the survey was conducted. The nature of this variable allows us to predict the propensity of children's dropouts by the estimation of a probit model (Goldberger 1964 ) in the form:
which is based on an underlying response variable Equation (16) is defined by the probability function
where the observed values captured in c follow a binomial distribution with probabilities depending on i X . In other words, we assume that at least a group of independent variables in i X explain the decision to stop sending children to school. In order to derive the marginal effects of model (16), we estimate the effect of one unit change in the explanatory variables on the probability of children´s dropouts as follows:
where the rates of change are computed in STATA at the means of the independent variables xiv . We have included in (16) table 6 ).
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Other things held constant at the mean, the marginal effects of a one percent increase in the amount of credit borrowed was predicted to decrease the probability of children's dropouts by about 0.023 percentage points. Similarly, when equation (19) was computed with I as the impact variable, treatment households reported, on the average, a 25% lower probability of withdrawing their children from school relative to the corresponding control group.
Additionally, when equation (19) was computed with M as the impact variable, we find that the marginal effect of one additional year of participation in a microcredit program was predicted to decrease the probability of children's dropouts by about 0.040 percentage points, ceteris paribus. This relatively small impact may reflect three different phenomena:
1) The presence of a short-run opportunity cost of school enrolment that increases once children get older and are able to generate income. If by borrowing from a microcredit programme, households manage to increase labor intensity (as reported in section 4), then an increased propensity of employing units of labor from young family members may be observed. In that context, access to credit, in combination with other policies such as cash grants to poor children conditional on school attendance, could substantially reduce negative long-run impacts of credit on human capital.
2) A substitution effect that has been reported by Pitt and Khandker (1998) 3) The effect of idiosyncratic income variability and transitory external shocks. When a household experiencing a sudden destabilizing event chooses to borrow additional money from, say, the local moneylender, this decision may prevent parents withdrawing their children from school in the short-run, although may actually increase the probability of children's dropouts in the long-run.
An interesting structural property of equation (19) 7 ).
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We have computed equation (19) 
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On the contrary, women borrowing from both a microcredit program and other lenders, with no participation in ROSCAS (group 3) have a much higher probability of withdrawing their children from school. We estimate that by borrowing from a moneylender, women increase the probability of children´s dropouts up to 75% ceteris paribus, and although this probability falls overtime, the negative impact remains considerable high even after 5 years of program participation, Pr( 0.50 5)
In this sense, institutional efforts aimed to design ex-post protective risk-coping products such emergency loans and insurance schemes could have important impacts on human capital.
Moreover, ex-ante preventive services, additional to voluntary savings schemes, aimed to improve financial literacy could reduce the propensity of households falling into a cycle of debt. Although experimentation and analysis will be needed to identify costs and benefits of policies of this kind, it is clear that benefits from financial literacy may go well beyond the expected rate of loan default.
Conclusions and policy recommendations
Our study has given important insights on the dynamics involving the relationship between credit and wider impacts on labor and human capital, with important implications for policy and institutional design: poverty targeting, either due to donors conditionality or organizational goals, is a common practice in microcredit to ensure that credit delivery reaches the intended beneficiary. This is done through indirect mechanisms such as upper limits on progressive lending or rigid monitoring devices such as periodical repayment schedules in group meetings that often keep out better off households from borrowing.
However, the evidence suggests that poverty targeting may actually diminish important trickle down effects through labor markets that could indirectly benefit poor laborers. Once enterprising households reach a minimum threshold of income, estimated at a level approximately three times as high as the poverty line derived for urban poverty in Mexico, the marginal propensity to hire units of labor increased significantly. We envisage that income level as a platform for employment generation. This platform is particularly important in the context of urban poverty, where farming activities are practically non-existent and labor usually represents the only income source for the extreme poor.
In this sense, by simply opening up the upper limits of progressive lending, microcredit programs could significantly increase the probability of achieving wider impacts through labor markets. As Mosley and Rock (2004:481) The evidence also suggests that the rigidity of monitoring devices such as periodical repayment schedules in group meeting may prevent borrowers to invest more units of labor and consequently, diminish the propensity of labor intensity. The time-intensity of such peer-monitoring devices may also exacerbate the substitution effect between parents' and children's time in self-employment activities and group meetings, with adverse impacts on children´s schooling and long-run effects on human capital. In this sense, any possible policy action directed to cut down time in group meetings, through improvements in the prevailing lending technology and practices could have significant wider impacts on human capital. In that course, experimentation should be encouraged, and perhaps facilitated by governmental agencies and other donors, to improve market efficiency and poverty impacts, through a number of possible policy actions that we summarize in table 8.
Expanding access to credit (and other financial services) is, beyond all doubt, critical for the poor. However, design factors can constrain the magnitude of the expected impacts.
In that context, we hope that our findings will serve as stimuli to the microcredit industry to explore other possible ways to improve practice and increase impact. In that effort, both institutions and households win, and the orthodox hypothesis of divisibility between equity and efficiency simply collapses. (2003) and Maddala (1999) for a detailed discussion on the properties of the identifying instrument.
v Since we have a data-censoring case demanding the variable
C to follow a homoskedastic normal distribution, we use a logarithmic transformation in our estimation strategy to make this assumption more reasonable. vi For further details on the derivation of the conditional mean functions, see Greene (2003) .
vii McDonald and Moffitt (1980) have decomposed equation (7.21 into two parts to obtain the effects of a change in i X on the conditional mean of i C , and on the probability that the observation will fall in the part of the distribution where 0 i C > .
viii In fact, we observed that mean value for this time-dimensional variable was 22 minutes for an outward journey. ix We adopted Lawrence Klein's rule of thumb (1961), to test DISTANCE for potential problems of collinearity. We did not find evidence of collinearity.
x Since we cannot observe λ, we assume that this factor is captured by the wage rate w. xi The poverty line at household level has been set up at 6570 pesos per month, which is the product of the capability-based poverty line at 1507.5 per month multiplied by household size using the equivalence factors proposed by Rothbarth (1943) . xii The statistics of the regression equations are: F(1, 20) = 32.81, p = 0.00; R 2 = 0.52 xiii A poverty trap emerges under situations where, on the one hand, wealthy households can afford to invest in human capital, e.g. in education, health and nutrition, and this enables them to increase their future productivity and wealth. On the other hand, poor households cannot afford to invest in human capital and as a consequence, earn low income and remain in poverty. The relationship between imperfect credit markets and the poverty trap has been analyzed by Ljungqvist (1993) . xiv For a discussion of the derivation of the marginal effects for a probit equation see Greene (2003) , Maddala (1999 ) or Wooldridge (2002 . Robust z-statistics in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% -62.23 -62.23 -61.46 -61.46 -64.20 -64 .20 Robust z statistics in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% a / Ci: logarithm of the maximum amount of credit borrowed (LGMAXCREDIT) b/ Ii:
LGMAXCREDIT is transformed into a dummy variable = 1 for treatment households c/ Mi : number of years of programme participation (MEMBERSHIP) 
Expected benefits
Employing the logarithm of the maximum amount of credit, C , as impact variable: small elasticity of labour intensity with respect to credit. A 1% increase in credit is predicted to increase in 0.029% the units of labour invested.
Employing a dummy variable for treatment households = 1, if > 0 
